Army doctrine on these operations is broad and extensively elaborated. In modern times, the invasions of Iraq in 1990/ perhaps best exemplify American large-scale, mechanized-armored combined arms operations. Combined arms doctrine today finds its roots in ancient Greek and Persian warfare, and its more modern character can be traced to the deployment of armor, infantry, and artillery in 17th-century combat. The idea of combined arms operations is, arguably, as old as organized violence itself, dating back to at least 3,000 BCE. The combined arms approach to operations during competition, crisis, and armed conflict is foundational to exploiting capabilities from all domains and their dimensions.” Confronted with a constantly changing situation, leaders create new combinations of capabilities, methods, and effects to pose new dilemmas for adversaries. Leaders combine arms in complementary and reinforcing ways to protect capabilities and amplify their effects. “the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. has announced it plans to provide to Ukraine.

and NATO allies are training Ukrainian military units on combined arms operations, including on at least some of the platforms the U.S. military and in NATO, few active service members have actual combat experience with the sort of large-scale mechanized and armor combined arms operations Ukraine is preparing to conduct, if only because such combat operations have been vanishingly rare over the last two decades. While Ukraine certainly has gained important combat experience over the last year, it has only slowly improved its ability to conduct combined arms operations. Combined arms combat operations are difficult, even for well-trained and well-equipped modern forces, and combined arms breaching of Russia’s defensive lines will likely prove similarly difficult, particularly at the battalion-, brigade-, or higher-level scale required. Ukrainian units have and continue to receive training in Europe on combined arms operations, as the combined effects of Ukrainian infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and other combat arms will likely be necessary to dislodge Russian forces from the country, particularly given Russia’s long-term and ongoing improvements to its defensive positions. Russia’s invasion of and ongoing war in Ukraine using mechanized and armored formations necessitated a range of Ukrainian responses, including resistance, defensive, and, increasingly, offensive operations.

Either outcome will likely depend on a range of factors, including details about what variants of what platforms the West provides the level and quality of the training and logistics packages (hopefully) accompanying equipment delivery the ability of Ukraine to actually generate combat power based on the provided equipment, training, and logistics and the types of operations in which Ukraine employs said combat power.

If the West can deliver on its promises to equip and train Ukraine with these mechanized and armored ground combat vehicles in a timely manner, perhaps even before this spring, it could be a “ game changer” - but not necessarily. The United States and some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have now pledged to deliver advanced infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks, and they are apparently considering advanced fighter jets, as well. The flurry of announced plans to increase Western military aid to Ukraine continues.

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